The Forces of Attraction: How Security Interests Shape Membership in Economic Institutions *

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May 22, 2020

Abstract

The link between security and economic exchange is widely recognized. But when and how much do geopolitical interests matter for economic cooperation? While existing work focuses on bilateral trade and aid, we examine how geopolitics shapes membership in multilateral economic organizations. We demonstrate that substantial discrimination occurs as states welcome or exclude states based on foreign policy similarity. Biased selection of members can politicize economic cooperation despite multilateral norms of non-discrimination. We test the geopolitical origins of institutional membership by analyzing new data on membership patterns for 231 economic organizations from 1949 – 2014. Evidence shows that security ties shape which states join and remain in organizations at both the formation and enlargement stages. We use a finite mixture model to compare the relative power of economic and geopolitical considerations, finding that geopolitical alignment accounts for nearly *half* of the membership decisions in economic institutions.

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1 Introduction

Like social clubs, international organizations sort states into groups. During the formation and enlargement of international organizations, membership depends on states' specific attributes relevant to the regulated issue as well as their broader political relations. *Geopolitical discrimination* occurs when states selectively allow those who share their foreign policy interests to enter international organizations. This paper measures the timing and weight allocated to geopolitics in the membership choices for multilateral economic organizations. We demonstrate that geopolitical discrimination has been a prevalent practice across a broad swathe of economic organizations for over sixty years. In this role, shared security interests form a foundation for economic cooperation.

We are not the first to study the interaction between states' economic and security interests (e.g. Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Mansfield and Bronson, 1997; Mansfield and Pollins, 2003; Lake, 2009). During the Cold War states allocated aid according to the military importance of recipients, and new strategic needs shape development policies today (e.g. Meernik, Krueger and Poe, 1998; Bearce and Tirone, 2010; Boutton and Carter, 2014; Bermeo, 2018). Like aid, trade flows tend to follow the flag (e.g. Pollins, 1989; Keshk, Reuveny and Pollins, 2004; Pandya, 2016). The income gains from trade spill over into military power, motivating states to trade with allies (Gowa, 1989; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994; Mansfield and Bronson, 1997; Long and Leeds, 2006). Other sources of influence can skew trade toward states with good relations (Berger et al., 2013; Fuchs and Klann, 2013). While there is wide recognition that geopolitical interests arise in the context of economic policy-making, less is known about the scope of these linkages.

Do these same forces that shape bilateral flows influence decisions regarding multilateral cooperation? Scholars have identified evidence of horse-trading within multilateral fora (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014; Lim and Vreeland, 2013), while others contend that multilateral regimes neutralize the influence of foreign relations (Carnegie, 2014; Milner and Tingley, 2013). We add to this literature by highlighting another important mechanism by which states link security and economic interests: the politicization of institutional membership. Alongside their role in solving market failures within a given issue area, international institutions can also serve as a forum for states to advance their foreign policy goals through economic statecraft. Our analysis demonstrates that security linkages extend beyond bilateral exchanges of trade and aid, that they are not limited to the Cold War period, and that they have shaped the foundation and evolution of global governance. We offer a theoretical explanation and empirical demonstration of the degree to which geopolitical interests matter for multilateral cooperation.

The use of geopolitical discrimination when states join multilateral institutions resolves a dilemma for states. On the one hand, the principle of non-discrimination and practice of collective decision-making render multilateral institutions inefficient as tools of economic statecraft. It is much easier for states to manipulate bilateral aid and trade policies where national governments wield control. On the other hand, multilateral institutions govern a large amount of economic activity, and states have incentives to exploit these gains for geopolitical advantage. Discrimination over membership allows states to steer benefits under the guise of multilateralism. Through this practice, powerful states build their geopolitical coalitions and weaker states minimize the reforms needed to gain entry.

Our theory of geopolitical discrimination implies a different pattern of institutional membership than existing arguments. Functional theories emphasize the ability of institutions to overcome market failures that hinder cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1984; Farrell and Newman, 2015; Koremenos, 2016). While not ruling out geopolitical considerations, functional theories do not treat security goals as a primary motive for membership. States select cooperation partners based on expected compliance and potential efficiency gains from policy coordination within a given issue area. In contrast, when states prioritize geopolitical alignment, they may invite weak compliers and exclude potential contributors. For example, Turkey was admitted to the OECD in 1961 despite its limited ability to contribute to economic coordination. More recently, Japan has resisted joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank while maintaining a strong commitment to development aid in East Asia. These are puzzling cases from a functional perspective until they are placed in geopolitical context. The question is whether they are rare exceptions or common practice.

To examine when and how geopolitics shapes economic cooperation, we analyze membership patterns in 231 multilateral organizations that include economic cooperation as part of their mandate.[1] The large set of organizations significantly broadens the scope of evidence beyond studies of single economic institutions, such as Davis and Wilf (2017). Using original data on organizations' accession procedures based on IGO charter rules for eligibility and approval, we construct a sample of potential memberships — excluding universal organizations with open membership and states outside the geographic jurisdiction of regionally-defined institutions. This allows us to focus on cases where existing members have discretion over new members. We develop a relational measure of geopolitical alignment based on alliance ties and UN voting similarity between potential members and other states in the organization. Here we differ from Donno, Metzger and Russett (2015), who test the role of monadic conflict involvement on probability of membership. Trade flows between new states and other members serve as a proxy for the functional theory that economic interdependence explains demand for institutionalized cooperation on economic issues. We find that measures of geopolitical alignment between countries are strongly predictive of membership even when controlling for trade ties. Where earlier work focused only on enlargement, our evidence reveals that geopolitical discrimination occurs during both the formation and

[1] We discuss the sample in more detail later in the paper, and conduct robustness checks on a smaller sample for organizations exclusively focused on economic activities.

enlargement of economic organizations.

After confirming that both geopolitical alignment and economic interdependence drive membership, we use a finite mixture model to estimate the relative weight accorded to security versus trade ties. This model specification allows us to estimate *how much* states care about security ties when making membership decisions, while recognizing that economic interests also play an important role. We find that geopolitical alignment motivates forty-four percent of the membership decisions in our sample of 231 multilateral economic organizations over the period 1949-2014. Far from being the exception, security ties are a prominent factor that shapes who joins and remains in multilateral economic organizations. These results suggest that existing studies about political favoritism within multilateral institutions may understate the role of geopolitics (e.g. Thacker, 1999; Stone, 2008; Dreher et al., 2013). Even before the odds can be stacked in the favor of certain states, geopolitical concerns influence who gets to play the game.

Our findings are important because the process that sorts states into IGOs may have powerful downstream effects on world politics. Some scholars examine the effect of membership for individual organizations such as the WTO, which has generated debate around its impact on trade (Rose, 2004; Gowa and Kim, 2005; Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz, 2007; Allee and Scalera, 2012). Others show that the number and type of shared institutional memberships alter more general patterns of trade and conflict (Russett and Oneal, 2001; Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom, 2004; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006; Haftel, 2007; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007). Membership can induce changes of behavior via socialization (Johnston, 2001; Bearce and Bondanella, 2007), and ties among states improve cooperation across many types of issues (Bohmelt, 2009).

Our results also present evidence of the selection bias that confronts research on the effectiveness of international institutions: the decision to join IGOs is endogenous to state preferences (e.g. Martin and

Simmons, 1998). Skeptics have long claimed that ex ante power and interests make regimes "epiphenomenal" and cooperation shallow (Mearsheimer, 1994/5; Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996). We demonstrate that non-random selection occurs through screening members on the basis of geopolitical relations. On the one hand, the politicization of membership offers a rebuttal to those who dismiss compliance as the result of screening for compliant states. On the other hand, research about how joint IGO membership encourages peace needs to account for the role of geopolitical alignment as a determinant of IGO membership.

Section 2 explains our argument about the role of geopolitical alignment as a force of attraction driving membership decisions. We specify observable implications to assess the theory's predictions for patterns of membership. In section 3, we introduce our data on economic IGOs and present the results of our empirical analysis of membership. A final section concludes.

2 Geopolitical Alignment as Basis for IGO Membership

We argue that the most powerful effect of geopolitics on multilateral institutions occurs through selection of members. Discretion over membership allows states to politicize institutional outcomes while circumventing the norms and procedures that encourage impartiality among members. In effect, they treat IGOs as discriminatory clubs. In discriminatory clubs, actors select members on the basis of certain attributes that are distinct from their contribution to effective regulation.[2] Membership reflects both the ability to contribute to the joint project and an intrinsic value to the group. Several empirical studies of IGO membership suggest patterns of discrimination. For example, states screen out others seen to represent a security risk or those that differ in regime type (Donno, Metzger and Russett, 2015; Kaoutzanis, Poast and Urpelainen, 2016). Davis and Wilf (2017) find evidence that geopolitical alignment shapes

[2]For discriminatory club good theory, see (Cornes and Sandler, 1996, p. 385). This contrasts with modeling cooperation among anonymous states based on their relative size (e.g. Stone, Slantchev and London, 2008)

both applications to join and accession negotiations in the trade regime. States are also more likely to cooperate with partners with whom they are linked in existing networks of agreements (Kinne, 2013). From this perspective, the appeal of joining an IGO depends on the composition of its members and not just mutual interests on a narrow issue.

When establishing an institution, nothing limits states in their choice of partners. Thereafter, vague membership rules and subjective policy evaluations enable current members to strategically admit some states while excluding others. The accession process of multilateral institutions ranges from the deposit of a ratification instrument to a rigorous review and vote by current members.[3] Even the most narrowly focused organizations show considerable variation in membership criteria — commodity organizations can include both producers and consumers, such as the International Cotton Advisory Committee, or focus exclusively on dominant producers, such as OPEC. The required level of policy reform may also differ by applicant. For example, WTO accession negotiations differ across members and over time, with cases such as Afghanistan gaining entry for making moderate reforms while Iran remains subject to policy reviews that hold up its entry. Through informal evolution of norms, states inserted democracy and human rights into the accession criteria for regional organizations even in some cases that lacked legal provisions in treaty documents (Duxbury, 2011).

2.1 The Benefits of Geopolitical Discrimination

Through geopolitical discrimination, allies sort into IGOs together. Security ties change incentives for joint multilateral cooperation in at least two ways: *security externalities* and *security linkages*. The security externality mechanism focuses on the inherent connection between economic and military power. Robust economic growth and the efficient employment of domestic resources allow states to amass

[3]Some institutions adopt a unanimity rule to approve entry by new states (Schneider and Urpelainen, 2012). See Hooghe et al. (2017) for detailed account of accession decision procedures for major international organizations.

greater military capacity. As a result, the efficiency gains from economic cooperation can be channeled into military power (Gowa, 1989; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994). States recognize these spillovers and respond strategically, steering the benefits of multilateral economic cooperation toward allies and away from adversaries.

Scholars have found evidence that the security externality logic drives bilateral economic exchange between states (Gowa, 1989; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993). Both leaders and the general public believe that it will be safer to increase trade with allies and exclude rivals (Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2018). Whether the mechanism extends to the multilateral context is unclear. Multilateral rules limit the ability of states to easily control the flow of material benefits. Moreover, if states gain positive utility from augmenting the capability of allies, they should demand full compliance with an institution's rules in order to maximize income gains. In practice, however, existing members often relax rules to facilitate the entry of their geopolitical allies. For example, the United States encouraged other GATT members to allow Japan to enter the trade regime without requiring the removal of substantial trade barriers, and it advocated admitting Korea to the OECD despite reservations by Korea to limit its financial liberalization. Finally, the security externality logic should be stronger in the presence of clearly divided alliance structures, such as those in the bipolar era.[4] But the end of the Cold War coincided with a surge of economic cooperation and an expanding scope for multilateral rules to govern these exchanges. The asymmetric entry provisions and continuity beyond the Cold War suggest another mechanism is at work.

In addition to the security externality logic, we argue institutions facilitate resource transfers as part of a security linkage strategy. Whereas the security externality arises as an indirect byproduct of economic exchange, a security linkage represents a joint decision that brings economic and security interests together. In this strategy, membership becomes a bargaining chip for states to expand their geopolitical

[4] Indeed, multilateral trade negotiations relied on bilateral deals based on the principal- supplier rule to isolate the exchange of benefits (Hicks and Gowa, 2018).

coalitions. Different preferences for security and economic cooperation create the opportunity for a mutually profitable exchange (Tollison and Willett, 1979; Davis, 2004; Poast, 2013). Some states may be more motivated by the prospective economic gains from membership, while others seek enhanced leverage on security matters. The institutional context strengthens the linkage by providing an exclusion mechanism that restricts cooperation to the subset of members and increases the credibility of promised benefits to recipients.

Two features of multilateral economic institutions support security linkages. First, membership is not automatic. States forming an institution choose to meet together and undertake the bargaining that establishes a new organization. Others can join through accession. Except for a small number of universal organizations that accept any applicant, membership requires an application and the approval of members. The accession process provides discretion such that states can inject political relations as a criteria to favor friends with easier terms of entry. Second, membership demarcates who receives the gains of cooperation.[5] Direct economic benefits include preferential market access, regulatory coordination, or financial assistance. As participants in decision-making, members can shape future rules in their own favor. Closer association with a particular group of states also confers reputational benefits as states improve their standing in the eyes of investors or gain credibility vis a vis hostile states (Kydd, 2001; Gray, 2013; Brooks, Cunha and Mosley, 2015; Gray and Hicks, 2014). Once a state joins, it continues to draw on this range of member benefits going forward without having to engage in repeated negotiations.

While security linkages are easier through bilateral channels, multilateral institutions hold distinct advantages. The international institution supports burden-sharing across a larger group of states. It also offers political cover when the exchange relationship may arouse controversy at home or vis-a-vis other countries. By acting within the multilateral context, states "launder" their influence attempts

[5]As distinct from public goods, club goods allow for possibility of exclusion through limiting benefits to those who contribute to the provision of the club good (Cornes and Sandler, 1996).

(Abbott and Snidal, 1998, pp. 18). The meetings that accompany multilateralism offer opportunities for exchanges among leaders that can build trust to support credible commitments linking economic and security cooperation (Bearce, 2003).

In their use of multilateral economic institutions to support strategic partners, states balance commitment and control. Membership promises an ongoing stream of benefits through both the channel of a security externality and issue linkage. Powerful states want to bring into IGOs those states who are most in need of side payments as part of long term relations of exchange (Lake, 2009). Although states could be expelled, multilateral decision processes raise a barrier that limits such extreme sanctions. In this way, IGO membership adds credibility to the commitment by one state to share benefits with another. Thereafter, side payments offer flexibility for short-term demands. When a priority looms large for a powerful member, it can shift the allocation of benefits to serve its goals (Stone, 2011). Even within the constraints of multilateral procedures, both financial institutions and trade institutions provide ways for states to lend more and trade more with their allies among the membership (Thacker, 1999; Gowa and Kim, 2005; Stone, 2008; Dreher et al., 2013). Joint membership also facilitates issue linkages that reward cooperation outside of the institution. For example, temporary members of the UN Security Council receive more aid through UNICEF, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Union (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Lim and Vreeland, 2013; Mikulaschek, 2018). Such deals shift the level of benefits among members, but within a smaller range than the gap between member and non-member states.

Through security externality and linkage policies, joint participation in economic institutions can strengthen security coalitions. Allies may use policy coordination outside of defense policies as one way to signal intentions and create a credible alliance commitment (Morrow, 2000). Supporting the membership of a security partner in a multilateral institution is difficult to reverse, especially relative to bilateral trade or aid flows. Any costs from letting in states that may not otherwise be optimal partners for economic cooperation are justified by the added credibility for their alliance. For example, allowing Turkey to join the original signatories founding the OECD in 1961 introduced greater heterogeneity among members' business practices and yet was worthwhile for the positive security signal attained through such cooperation. Easy entry is a form of patronage to favor allies or bribery to gain leverage over critical swing states in a broad security coalition. Evidence suggests the strategy works: Powers (2004) demonstrates that alliances embedded in regional trade agreements are less prone to conflict, Henke (2017) shows that diplomatic ties have a positive effect on formation of multilateral military coalitions, and Poast (2013) finds that linking alliance ties with trade provisions increases alliance performance.

The flip side of favoritism for friends is the exclusion of rivals. This denies the benefits of the organization to rival states while holding out entry as a carrot to induce improved behavior. For example, China was close to having GATT accession approved when the Tiananmen massacre led to the suspension of negotiations. Similarly, the United States has wielded its veto over Iranian accession to the WTO as a bargaining chip in negotiations over its nuclear weapons program (Davis and Wilf, 2017). Russia's accession talks with the OECD were put on hold in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Once allowed into a multilateral organization, such leverage is severely diminished (Milner and Tingley, 2013; Carnegie, 2014).

Our argument about geopolitical discriminations differs from functional regime theory because security interests lie outside regime jurisdiction. Keohane (1984) argues that demand for international institutions arises from their ability to resolve market failures as international organizations reduce transaction costs and overcome information problems. This implies we should observe a membership selection process based on common interests within the issue area regulated by the institution. Others argue that democracy and democratic transitions increase demand for IGOs as a means to credibly commit to the policy reforms of the institution, which also implies shared interest in specific issue area (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006; Kaoutzanis, Poast and Urpelainen, 2016). We emphasize that outside linkages unrelated to issues regulated by the institution also matter for who wants to join.

We also depart from institutional design theories in our expectation that states may accept lower regime effectiveness for the sake of foreign policy benefits. Several studies have examined how institutional design determines the optimal size of IGOs to maximize cooperation benefits. These scholars contend that states structure membership to address enforcement concerns and the distribution of gains from cooperation (e.g. Martin, 1992; Kahler, 1992; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001; Drezner, 2007; Koremenos, 2016). These studies highlight an important trade-off between depth of rules and breadth of participation that generates conflicting incentives for the ideal membership size of institutions (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, p. 796). A small group with similar preferences can more readily reach agreements and monitor compliance, but a larger group offers more benefits (Kahler, 1992; Stone, Slantchev and London, 2008; Thompson and Verdier, 2014). In some cases, small groups set the rules and gradually expand to admit new members as their preferences converge (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1998; Jupille, Mattli and Snidal, 2013; Gray, Lindstädt and Slapin, 2017). In other cases, states allocate different levels of decision authority across members (Gilligan, 2004; Stone, 2011; Hooghe and Marks, 2015). For these studies of institutional design, states maximize regime effectiveness when they adjust the scope of membership based on the interests regulated by the regime. In contrast, when states let non-regime issues such as security determine membership choices, they open themselves to less effective regimes through overexpansion as they let in unqualified applicants or underprovision of cooperation when states leave out otherwise qualified entrants.

We recognize that state preferences may arise from both functional demand for gains from regime cooperation and geostrategic goals. States must balance the desire to exploit selection of members for geopolitical gain with the functional tradeoffs discussed above. The key task is differentiating their relative impact on outcomes. Next we turn to evaluate how much geopolitics matters.

2.2 Testable Implications for Membership Patterns

To test our theory of IGO membership, we examine whether states are more likely to join international organizations when they share geopolitical alignment with current members. Our research design uses observational data about state behavior, making it hard to identify causal effects. To reduce the risk of a spurious finding, we use multiple measures of geopolitical alignment, explore alternative model specifications, and exploit dynamic breaks in alignment to more closely identify the mechanism.

We compare geopolitical alignment with economic interdependence as two forces that influence the demand for membership. Since geopolitical alignment and interests within the issue area overlap entirely in the area of security organizations, looking at economic organizations provides a better test. Our argument contends that security interests shape membership even in multilateral economic organizations, while the functional perspective would suggest a smaller role. We use shared alliances as our primary operationalization of geopolitical alignment, and analyze similarity of alliance portfolios and UN voting patterns as two alternative measures. Trade ties between states control for the underlying interdependence that contributes to functional demand for cooperation on economic policies.

We also examine conditions that influence the importance of security interests. First, we distinguish between geopolitical alignment with all members of international organizations versus the most powerful member states. In principle, any existing member state can link accession of potential members to shared security interests. Below, we measure a state's geopolitical ties with all IGO members to assess how comprehensively the state shares foreign policy interests with existing members. Then we separately measure a state's ties with powerful states, who are the most likely to engage in linkage strategies as they cement relationships with strategic partners (Schneider and Urpelainen, 2012). Our relational measures of alignment differ from the monadic approach of current studies. For example, Kaoutzanis, Poast and Urpelainen (2016) focus on the regime type of new entrants and Donno, Metzger and Russett (2015) examine their conflict history.

Second, we analyze whether the role of geopolitical alignment differs over the lifespan of an IGO. Establishing an IGO raises transaction costs as states negotiate the IGO charter and set up a headquarters and financial base. While states may use security linkages to overcome the initial cooperation challenges, they could focus strictly on policy when establishing the rules of the game and only later politicize membership. Prior work on screening members has been limited to enlargement (Kydd, 2001; Schneider, 2009; Stone, 2011; Donno, Metzger and Russett, 2015). Through separate analysis of each stage, we test how geopolitics shapes membership at founding and enlargement.

3 Empirical Analysis of IGO Membership Patterns

Our empirical tests have two primary objectives. First, we estimate the effect of geopolitical alignment on the probability of IGO membership in a series of regression models, controlling for functional economic interests. Second, we estimate the relative weight given to geopolitical and functional considerations. We use a finite mixture model to assess which observations are more consistent with geopolitics or economic interdependence, and to show the conditions under which states privilege one over the other.

3.1 Data

We analyze a sample of 231 economic IGOs for the period from 1949 to 2014.[6] Starting with the the Correlates of War (COW) International Organizations Dataset (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke,

[6]Economic topics are broadly construed to include aid, finance, trade, and more general management of resources, travel, and standards relevant for economic exchange. Our coding of organizations draws on the Yearbook of International Organizations' description of the aims and subject of each organization along with information contained in the IGO charter documents.

2004), we identify IGOs with an economic focus and a publicly available formal charter.[7] We code the charter provisions for membership eligibility and the accession process for each IGO.

We conduct our analysis at the level of the state-IGO-year (Poast and Urpelainen, 2013; Donno, Metzger and Russett, 2015). This unit of observation reflects the decision process we seek to model: when a state elects to form or join an IGO, it considers a specific group of other states. Because we are interested in how states exploit discretion over membership, we limit our sample to "potential but not automatic" IGO memberships. This entails two exclusions from the set of all possible state-IGO-year pairings in the period 1949-2014.[8] First, we exclude IGOs where existing members have no discretion to select new entrants.[9] This removes organizations where membership is functionally automatic for states that seek entry, like the Universal Postal Union or International Maritime Organization. Second, we exclude state-IGO pairings for regional organizations where the state resides outside the regional scope of the IGO.[10] As a result, the sample does not include memberships that have no meaningful chance of being instantiated (e.g., Swedish membership in the African Union). This generates 570,695 state-IGO-year observations.[11]

The dependent variable, *IGO Membership*$_{ijt}$, is a dichotomous measure of whether state *i* is a member of organization *j* in year *t*. *IGO Membership* is equal to 1 in 36.9% of observations. In the tests below, we also subset this sample to assess whether geopolitical alignment has different effects on joining

[7]Results are not contingent on our exclusion of IGOs without charter documents.

[8]Our empirical results are robust to the inclusion of these observations. See Table A7 in the Appendix for results on a sample of all state-IGO-year observations.

[9]We identify these "universal" IGOs by examining their founding charters. IGOs are universal, and thus excluded from the sample, if there are no formal restrictions on membership eligibility or requirement for a vote of approval by members.

[10]State regions are coded using the World Bank's "country and lending groups" classification scheme (`http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups`), which assigns each state to one of seven regions: East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. IGOs are coded as regional if their charter or organizational title references a geographic region.

[11]IGOs enter the dataset in the year in which they are founded and continue until 2014 or the year that the organization ends. We include all states listed in the COW state system for which we have data on covariates. Covariate coverage primarily excludes small states (e.g., Grenada) or those where data is unavailable (North Korea). We follow the COW coding for the start and end of IGO existence.

as a founding member, joining later by accession, or exiting the organization. Our theory suggests security externalities and linkage will shape incentives for both founding members and those joining later, so our main sample pools these two paths to membership. Yet to account for potential differences in these underlying decision processes and address alternative approaches in the literature, we also test our argument separately within each subset.[12]

Formal alliances are our primary measure of geopolitical alignment.[13] The variable $\textit{Average Alliances}_{ijt}$ measures the proportion of IGO *j*'s member states with which state *i* shares a formal alliance in a given year. In the sample, it ranges from 0 (49.7% of observations) to 1 (4.5% of observations) with a mean value of 0.15. Second, $\textit{Lead State Alliance}_{ijt}$ indicates whether state *i* shares an alliance with the leading economic power among member states of IGO *j* during year *t*, with economic power measured annually by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In our sample, states are allied with an IGO's most powerful member state in 23% of state-IGO-years.

We also analyze two alternative measures of geopolitical alignment. *S-scores* is a continuous measure of similarity across states' entire portfolio of alliances; it reaches its maximum (1) when two states have identical alliance portfolios.[14] *UN Ideal Point Similarity* is a continuous variable that increases as the UN voting records of two states converge (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten, 2017). This measure offers a broader perspective on the foreign policy orientation of states across a range of topics on the international agenda and has been widely used in the literature to measure geopolitical alignment (e.g. Bearce and Bondanella, 2007; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). Each alternative measure is operationalized to create both an "average" and "lead state" variable.

Trade with IGO members and trade with the IGO lead state measure the impact of shared economic

[12]Donno, Metzger and Russett (2015) focus their analysis of IGO accession on the enlargement phase, and Poast and Urpelainen (2013) demonstrate that the politics of forming new IGOs differs from joining existing IGOs.

[13]Data on alliances, which include defense pacts and neutrality or nonaggression pacts, come from version 4.1 of the COW Formal Alliances dataset (Gibler, 2009).

[14]S-scores are calculated using the COW formal alliance dataset.

ties.[15] We include monadic variables for income (GDP per capita, logged), market size (GDP, logged), and trade openness (total trade / GDP).[16] Conditioning on these economic variables addresses the possibility that economic flows and security interests are jointly determined.

We control for additional variables that influence the demand to join IGOs and the willingness of members to grant entry. Polity scores capture the tendency of democratic states to join and form IGOs with higher frequency (Russett and Oneal, 2001; Poast and Urpelainen, 2015). We account for the screening out of conflict-prone states (Donno, Metzger and Russett, 2015) by including a variable measuring the number of fatal militarized disputes (MIDs) between state i and members of IGO j.[17] To address potential diffusion effects, the variable *Total IGO Membership* is a count of members in each IGO, which could exert positive attraction for other states to enter. Since neighbors may exert stronger influence over states, we also include a variable for *Members from Region* indicating the number of states residing in state i's geographic region that are members of IGO j. Separate control variables measure shared colonial history as well as a state's average geographic distance from IGO j's member states.[18]

Finally, the design of the IGO influences its openness to new members. An indicator for *Stringent Accession* identifies organizations that require a supermajority or unanimous consent of existing member states to admit new members, according to the founding charter.[19] We include an indicator for regional organizations and follow Carter and Signorino (2010) in modeling time dependence with a cubic polynomial for t in all models. A Cold War indicator (1947-1991) adjusts for baseline differences in membership rates during the bipolar era.

[15] Bilateral trade data is from the IMF Direction of Trade dataset. The "trade with members" variable measures average (logged) volume of merchandise imports and exports between state i and each member of IGO j. The "trade with lead state" variable measures (logged) trade volume with the lead state. We add one before taking the log to ensure values of zero trade are not excluded due to the mathematical transformation.

[16] We use the natural log of GDP and GDP per capita in constant 1967 US dollars. Data through 2004 are from Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz (2007); we use adjusted World Bank GDP estimates to fill in subsequent years.

[17] MIDs data are from the dyadic version of the COW Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset .

[18] Data on geographic distance and colonial linkages are from CEPII.

[19] We also include IGOs that require potential members to receive approval from a specific committee. Approximately a third of the IGOs in our sample (75) have stringent accession procedures.

3.2 Logistic Regression Models

We first use a logistic regression model to predict the dichotomous outcome variable, IGO membership. Independent variables are lagged by one year, and standard errors are clustered at the country level. We estimate the following model of IGO membership for state *i* in IGO *j* and year *t*:

$$\Pr(\text{IGO membership}_{ijt} = 1) \quad = \quad logit^{-1}(\alpha + \beta_1 \text{Alliances}_{ijt-1} + \beta_2 X_{ijt-1})$$

The model predicts IGO membership using our primary operationalization of geopolitical alignment, formal alliances. All models include a set of control variables X_{ijt}, which are measured at the level of the state-IGO-year (e.g., Trade and fatal MIDs with IGO Members); state-year (Trade Openness, GDP, GDP per capita, Polity); and IGO (Stringent Accession, Regional IGO).

We begin using the *Average Alliances* measure of geopolitical alignment. Table 1 displays results for a reduced form specification (Model 1) and a full model with all control variables (Model 2). In these first specifications, we assess membership in the broadest sense, including states' entry into an IGO and each year of continued membership.[20] The results support our primary hypothesis: as states share more alliances with an IGO's member states, they are significantly more likely to join the organization. In the full model, a one standard deviation increase in the *Average Alliances* measure increases the probability of membership, on average, from 35 to 41%. The relationship holds when controlling for functional economic interests (measured by trade with IGO members), which also has a positive and significant association with IGO membership.[21]

Model 3 restricts the sample to examine state entry into IGOs, including those who join in the found-

[20]This is consistent with Stone (2011), who theorizes participation in IGOs as an ongoing process of decisions to enter and continue cooperation.

[21]States' alliance and trade ties are positively correlated in our sample (0.18), consistent with existing work demonstrating that allies are more likely to trade with each other (Gowa and Mansfield, 1993). Our estimates for the effect of alliances are therefore likely to be conservative: by controlling for trade ties, we omit one potential causal pathway (*alliances* $\rightarrow$ *trade* $\rightarrow$ *IGO membership*) in which alliances encourage IGO membership.

ing year and those who join later by accession. This sample omits the years after a state has joined an organization, acknowledging that they rarely reevaluate membership decisions in any given year.[22] Both geopolitical alignment and trade ties have a strong, positive association with entry.

Models 4-6 analyze how security interests shape IGO membership at different stages in the evolution of a regime. Model 4 examines state entry as a founding member in the year of IGO *formation*.[23] Model 5 considers entry by accession during the subsequent years of IGO *enlargement*.[24] In both periods of formation and enlargement, geopolitical alignment has a significant association with entry. Model 6 reverses the membership question to analyze exit from IGOs; shared alliances do not significantly affect the likelihood of a state exiting IGOs.[25]

Model 7 adds fixed effects at the state and IGO level to the state entry sample in Model 3, addressing unobserved heterogeneity unique to each state and organization that influence the likelihood of membership. The effect of geopolitical alignment is even stronger. Trade with IGO members also significantly increases IGO membership. In the cross-section analysis (Models 2-6), high income correlates with lower average probability of membership, but when looking at the relationship within a given country we observe that states are more likely to join as their income grows. Finally, a difference-in-differences specification (Model 8) examines how changes in geopolitical alignment influence shifts in IGO membership among state-IGO pairs.[26] The coefficient estimates suggest a strong effect of geopolitical alignment:

[22]This "entry" sample is equivalent to a model of membership onset. Following McGrath (2015), we treat continued membership as missing for this model. This sample has a much lower probability of membership at .003 (relative to .37 for sample in models 1 and 2) given that it drops current members while retaining observations for all non-members. This attenuates the effect size substantively.

[23]The sample in Model 4 only includes the year of formation for each IGO, yielding a smaller sample. Thirty-eight IGOs created before 1950 drop from the sample.

[24]The sample in Model 5 excludes the year of formation for each IGO, examining state entry in subsequent years. As in model 3, we exclude continued membership after a state has joined an IGO.

[25]The dependent variable in this model is a dichotomous measure of exit, equal to one when existing members leave an IGO. We use rare events logit because exit is very infrequent (0.12% of observations).

[26]Here, we revert to the full sample used in Model 2. Following Lechner (2011), we use a linear probability model for the difference-in-differences specification. We remove the "Cold War" indicator in this specification, since the model includes year fixed effects.

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership							
	(1) Baseline	(2) Full	(3) Entry	(4) Formation	(5) Enlargement	(6) Exit	(7) State-IGO FE	(8) Diff-in-Diff
Average Alliances	1.321***	1.949***	1.279***	1.296***	1.355***	−0.289	3.418***	0.335***
	(0.113)	(0.171)	(0.231)	(0.145)	(0.303)	(0.262)	(0.335)	(0.027)
Trade with Members	0.196***	0.296***	0.185***	0.168***	0.245***	−0.012	0.153***	0.012***
	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.001)
Polity	0.001	0.011*	0.022**	0.019***	0.024*	−0.014	0.017**	0.002***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.001)
GDP	−0.098***	0.053	−0.001	−0.060**	−0.019	0.042	−0.677***	0.022***
	(0.018)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.030)	(0.085)	(0.060)	(0.203)	(0.006)
GDP per capita		−0.245***	−0.091*	−0.225***	−0.090	−0.188***	0.582***	−0.015***
		(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.190)	(0.005)
Trade Openness		−0.014***	−0.032***	−0.036	−0.039***	0.015	−0.028***	−0.0005**
		(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.0002)
Stringent Accession		0.069	0.128	−0.514***	0.248*	−0.238*		0.012**
		(0.049)	(0.113)	(0.048)	(0.134)	(0.135)		(0.005)
Regional IGO		0.325***	−0.218	0.121*	−0.344*	−0.806***	−2.584***	0.040***
		(0.102)	(0.146)	(0.069)	(0.191)	(0.199)	(0.353)	(0.012)
Cold War		−0.038	−0.271***	−0.340***	−0.191***	−1.056***	−0.580***	
		(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.098)	(0.068)	(0.280)	(0.072)	
Observations	570,695	570,695	371,350	10,590	360,767	211,039	371,350	570,695
# IGOs	231	231	231	193	231	227	231	231
# States	164	164	164	164	164	164	164	164

Table 1: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership*. Results of logit models estimating the effect of alliances on membership in economic IGOs. Coefficient estimates are displayed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models 2-6 include the following controls (not shown): *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *State-IGO Same Region*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

a one standard deviation shift in *Average Alliances* increases the probability of membership by 9.05%.

In Figure 1, we compare the effect of *Average Alliances* with the effect of holding an alliance with the lead state of an IGO.[27] Geopolitical alignment with an IGO's most powerful member state measured by GDP has a significantly larger effect. Shifting the *Average Alliances* variable by one standard deviation above the mean (from .149 to .419) increases the probability of IGO membership, on average, by 5.9 percentage points. Moving the *Lead State Alliance* variable from 0 to 1 increases the probability of membership by 12.0 percentage points, equivalent to adding an alliance with more than 50% of other IGO members. These are substantial effects, given a baseline membership rate of 36.9%. The figure shows consistent results for the alternative measures (*S-scores* and *UN Ideal Point similarity*).[28] Trade with IGO members shows the expected positive effect. In contrast to alliance ties, trade ties influence membership patterns more strongly through the pull of the average state than the lead state.

Over the evolution of the organization, states join by different paths to entry. Other studies of membership have limited their scope to countries joining an existing organization through accession (e.g. Donno, Metzger and Russett, 2015; Kaoutzanis, Poast and Urpelainen, 2016). By including the full set of membership observations, we are able to highlight the significance of geopolitics for both formation and enlargement. When looking at effects in separate sub-samples, we find that the effect of geopolitical alignment has larger magnitude at formation than enlargement (Appendix Figure A1). When overcoming high transaction costs to initiate cooperation, prior relations outside the area of cooperation exercise considerable influence.

[27]For Figure 1 and subsequent empirical tests, we use the pooled sample of state-IGO-year observations from Model 2 above. Appendix C replicates all subsequent tests with the entry-only sample from Model 3. The significant positive effect of alliances persists in this sample.

[28]Appendix Table A1 shows the full set of coefficients and standard errors when replicating Table 1, Models 1-2 using *S-scores* and *UN Ideal Point similarity*. Appendix Figure A1 shows the substantive effect of these measures in the entry-only, IGO formation, and IGO enlargement samples from Table 1 Models 3-5. The alliance measures of geopolitical alignment are significant and positive across samples. In the truncated entry-only sample that drops current members, the smaller effect size is relative to a lower 3.2% baseline probability of membership. The average measures for *S-scores* and *UN Ideal Point similarity* are significant predictors of entry, while the lead state measures are insignificant.



Figure 1: *Substantive Effect of Geopolitical Alignment*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting the independent variable listed on the x-axis. Continuous variables are increased by one standard deviation above the sample mean; dichotomous variables are shifted from 0 to 1. All other covariates are held at their observed values. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 quasi-bayesian monte carlo simulations of the full model (Model 2).

Figure A2 in the appendix shows a similar effect of *Average Alliances* across different samples of economic IGOs. We find statistically identical effects in a sub-sample of 79 "highly salient" organizations.[29] The effect of geopolitical alignment is notably larger in regional organizations compared to organizations that are not geographically delimited. Finally, we find a smaller effect in organizations with stringent accession procedures.

Expanding our sample beyond the focus on economic organizations, we also compare the effect of geopolitical alignment across issue areas (see appendix Figure A3). As expected, security-oriented IGOs feature the strongest association between alliance patterns and institutional membership. Compared to

[29]We define as salient any IGO which received at least 50 references in major newspapers during the founding year or when our sample ends in 2014.

economic IGOs, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the average alliance measure is more than twice as large in security organizations. Geopolitical alignment exhibits the smallest pull in decisions to join environmental IGOs. The ordering across these issue areas supports the logic that states use the institutional venue for building a security coalition, whether directly coordinating security policies or drawing on economic benefits. Environmental organizations that regulate by restricting harmful policies for the sake of public goods provision offer fewer opportunities for side payments to allies.

To address concerns about endogeneity between alliances and IGO membership, we examine whether *sudden reversals* in states' geopolitical orientation has an impact on IGO membership. In cases where states experience sharp breaks in their alliance patterns — defined as changing at least ten alliances in a given year (e.g., Turkey gaining 13 allies when it joined NATO in 1952) — we ask whether they are more likely to enter organizations with their new alliance partners and exit IGOs populated by former allies. Table 2 shows that for a subset of sixty-eight states with a major shift in their geopolitical alignment, the new set of alliance ties correlate significantly with IGO entry. Following the alliance change, states are more likely to join IGOs with their new allies and less likely to join organizations with their former alliance partners (Column 1). The estimates in the exit model (Column 2) are statistically insignificant.

Additional robustness tests are displayed in the Appendix. We ensure that our results are not driven by a specific type of economic IGO by separately removing trade, bank, and commodity organizations from the sample. Geopolitical alignment has a positive effect in each case, mitigating concerns that the results rely on one subset of organizations. To assess how rules limit or augment the impact of geopolitics, we include an interaction with stringent IGO accession procedures and the *Average Alliances* variable. The negative interaction effect implies that geopolitics plays less of a role in IGOs with a stringent accession process. We estimate a model with separate coefficients for geopolitical alignment in the Cold War and post-Cold War era to confirm that the relationship is not specific to one era. Indeed, there is no significant difference in the effect of alliances during and after the Cold War. We similarly find no significant differences when using decade-period interaction effects.

	Entry	Exit
	(1)	(2)
New Alliance with Members	0.423^{***}	0.855
	(0.151)	(0.625)
Dropped Alliance with Members	-1.043^{***}	-0.896
	(0.355)	(0.906)
Trade with Members	0.088^{***}	0.166^{**}
	(0.033)	(0.077)
Polity	0.047^{***}	-0.155^{***}
	(0.015)	(0.043)
GDP	0.117	0.074
	(0.073)	(0.211)
GDP per capita	-0.017	-0.182
	(0.078)	(0.321)
Trade Openness	-0.069	0.596^{**}
	(0.050)	(0.295)
Stringent Accession	0.100	1.019^{*}
	(0.161)	(0.566)
Observations	19,123	9,819
# IGOs	212	172
# States	68	68

Table 2: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership: Sudden Reversals in Geopolitical Orientation*. Models examine whether sharp breaks in geopolitical alignment, defined as a state adding or dropping at least ten alliances in a given year, affect the probability of entry (Model 1) and exit (Model 2). The sample includes the five year span after a state experiences a sharp break in geopolitical alignment. Models include all controls in Table 1, Column 2. Statistical significance denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Results are also robust to the use of defense pacts instead of all alliances; the exclusion of NATO members; the exclusion of eight economic IGOs that serve as alliances (e.g. Commonwealth of Independent States); a lagged dependent variable; and additional controls for foreign direct investment, total alliance memberships of the state, and geographic distance between the state and IGO members. We fit a Cox proportional hazards model to test whether geopolitical alignment influences states' time to entry for each IGO.[30] We expand the sample to all state-IGO-year observations, including those that had been dropped to construct the "potential but not automatic" sample. In all cases, shared security interests continue to exert a strong influence on IGO membership. Finally, we investigate the interactive effect of *Average Alliances* and *Trade with Members*. While alliances and trade each represent an independent force of attraction, the negative interaction effect suggests the two dimensions more likely function as substitutes rather than complements. States with greater geopolitical alignment with existing IGO members receive a smaller boost in membership from trade ties than those with lower levels of geopolitical alignment. See Tables A2-A7 for these results.

3.3 Finite Mixture Model

We have seen that across a large sample of economic institutions, geopolitical alignment is a significant predictor of IGO membership. This is important evidence for the effect of geopolitical alignment, but leaves two additional questions unanswered. First, how powerful is our hypothesized geopolitical model compared to the functional economic explanation? Second, under what conditions do states privilege geopolitical considerations over economic interests? To answer these questions, we estimate a finite mixture model. The mixture model allows for multiple distinct theoretical processes to drive outcomes. As Imai and Tingley (2012, p. 218) explain, "each observation is assumed to be generated either from a statistical model implied by one of the rival theories or more generally from a weighted combination of multiple statistical models under consideration." In a single framework, researchers can judge the relative explanatory power of competing theories.

[30] Our key explanatory variable for average alliances meets the proportional hazard assumption. However, diagnostic tests reveal a potential violation of the trade ties variable, which has an effect that changes over time. We add a time interaction that captures the conditional effect of a variable that violates the PHA with years of eligibility as recommended by Licht (2011).

In our case, we hypothesize that some membership decisions are consistent with the geopolitical alignment logic and others are consistent with a functional explanation. The analysis assumes that each observation comes from a probability distribution over the two competing models. For example, the observation corresponding to Turkey's potential membership in the European Union in 2010 may have a 25% likelihood of arising from the geopolitical model, and a 75% likelihood for the functional economic model.[31] These probabilities can be interpreted as the relative weight placed on geopolitics and economics when determining membership in a given state-IGO-year. The estimation of weights is guided by a set of *model-predicting* variables which help determine which model is most appropriate. For state *i* and IGO *j* in year *t*, the probability of assignment to the geopolitical model (π_G) is:

$$\pi_{G,ijt} \quad = \quad logit^{-1}(\delta + \delta_1 \text{Cold War}_t + \delta_2 \text{Polity}_{ijt-1} + \delta_3 \text{Stringent Accession}_j)$$

The *model-predicting* variables are akin to scope conditions, informing the relative applicability of each competing model. These variables are measured at different levels of analysis, matching the multilevel nature of our state-IGO-year sample. The first is an indicator for the Cold War period, reflecting the realist expectation that geopolitical considerations will be strongest when the distribution of power is characterized by bipolarity. The second is a measure of domestic regime type (Polity scores), capturing the liberal notion that the structure of state-society relations shapes foreign policy decisions. Third, we include the indicator for whether an IGO's charter contains stringent accession procedures to limit membership.[32]

For each observation, the outcome (IGO Membership) is generated via a weighted combination of the geopolitical and functional economic models.

[31] See Figure A4 in the Appendix for the distribution of model assignments in the fitted model.

[32] Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) contend that IGOs limit membership to address enforcement or uncertainty about preferences.

$$\text{Geopolitical: } \Pr(\text{Membership}_{ijt}) = logit^{-1}(\alpha + \beta_1 \text{Alliances}_{ijt-1} + \beta_3 D_{ijt-1})$$

$$\text{Economic: } \Pr(\text{Membership}_{ijt}) = logit^{-1}(\alpha_2 + \delta_1 \text{Trade}_{ijt-1} + \delta_3 D_{ijt-1})$$

We specify the geopolitical model using the *Average Alliances* variable and the control variables included in the full model from Table 1 (Column 2) while excluding the measure of trade ties. The functional economic model excludes the alliances variable and instead includes *Trade with Members*.[33] These specifications make it possible to identify a "geopolitical" and "economic" model *a priori*.

We first provide results for the two competing models — geopolitics versus functional economic preferences — that drive patterns of state membership in economic IGOs. Table 3 displays coefficient estimates from the geopolitical (Column 1) and economic (Column 2) components of the mixture model, as well as a pooled model of IGO membership formation for comparison (Column 3).[34]

In the geopolitical model, the estimated effect of *Average Alliances* is more than twice as large as the original pooled estimate (shown in Column 3). A one standard deviation (0.27) increase in the *Average Alliances* variable is associated with a 15.04% increase in the probability of IGO membership, and the shift from no alliance with a lead state to holding such an alliance is associated with a 19.43% increase in the probability of IGO membership (see table A8 for lead state results). The larger effect suggests that among the observations identified by the model as consistent with a geopolitical logic, security relationships have a very powerful influence on IGO membership decisions. The key independent variable in the economic model, *Trade with Members*, is similarly larger in magnitude than in the pooled model.[35] Some control variables have different effects across the two models. For example, IGOs with stringent

[33] Though both models include the same control variables, the coefficients are allowed to vary across the two theories.

[34] We use the main sample of state-IGO-year observations from Table 1, Model 2. Appendix Table A11 replicates the analysis with the entry-only sample. The model is estimated using the *flexmix* package in R (Grun and Leisch, 2008). Coefficients and standard errors are obtained by estimating a weighted logistic regression, with weights corresponding to each observation's assignment to the two competing models.

[35] Increasing *Trade with Members* by one standard deviation (4.20) is associated with a 31.24% increase in the probability of IGO membership.

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership		
	Geopolitical Model	Economic Model	Pooled Model
Average Alliances	4.964***		1.949***
	(0.166)		(0.171)
Trade with Members		0.826***	0.296***
		(0.033)	(0.033)
Polity	−0.018***	0.010	0.011*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
GDP	0.242***	−0.181***	0.053
	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.062)
GDP per capita	−0.215***	−0.467***	−0.245***
	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.043)
Trade Openness	0.020***	−0.172***	−0.014***
	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Stringent Accession	0.389***	−0.326***	0.069
	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.049)
Regional IGO	0.529***	0.128	0.325***
	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.102)
Existing Members from Region	0.094***	0.304***	0.139***
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Fatal MIDs with Members	−0.044	0.896***	0.243*
	(0.097)	(0.164)	(0.129)
Cold War	−0.130**	−0.029	−0.038
	(0.053)	(0.042)	(0.039)
Observations	251,500	319,195	570,695

Table 3: *IGO Membership: Geopolitical vs. Economic Models*. Models 1-2 display results of a finite mixture model which assumes IGO Membership is driven either by a geopolitical process (Model 1) or an economic process (Model 2). Model 3 is a pooled specification in which all observations are assumed to arise from the same data-generating process. All are estimated by a logistic regression with cubic polynomial terms to correct for time dependence (not shown). Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

accession procedures tend to attract more members among observations driven by geopolitics, while stringent accession depresses membership among observations driven by economic considerations.

The mixture model compares the explanatory power of each theory. In our case, the model estimates that the geopolitical explanation is nearly as powerful as the functional model: 44.1% of observations in the sample are consistent with the geopolitical model, while the remaining 55.9% are more accurately explained by the functional economic model.[36] Very few observations are entirely explained by one model. The pattern in FigureA4 shows clearly that a mixture of geopolitical and economic conditions shape membership. This is notable given that the sample includes only economic institutions. When we measure trade and alliances with the lead state in an IGO, the mixture model assigns an even greater proportion of observations to the geopolitical model, with 56.0% of membership decisions driven by geopolitics (see Table A8 in the Appendix).

Because each observation is assigned to a weighted combination of the competing geopolitical and economic models, we can assess the conditions under which the geopolitical logic dominates functional economic considerations. Figure 2 demonstrates that as the Cold War progressed, states put a greater emphasis on geopolitics in their IGO membership decisions. This trend declined slightly in the waning years of the Cold War before increasing sharply as the fall of the Iron Curtain shifted states' geopolitical orientations. Although the tendency to prioritize geopolitics has declined in the post-Cold War era, our results suggest that the post-Cold War observations in our sample are driven by geopolitical considerations approximately 41.8% of the time. This evidence counters the view that Cold War bipolarity is necessary for security to shape membership decisions.

We can compare the geopolitical and functional economic models across a range of other dimensions

[36] We calculate this measure by summing over all observations' probability of assignment to Model 1 and Model 2. See Table A10 in the Appendix for equivalent results for a mixture model fitted on the entry-only sample and for estimates of the geopolitical and trade models' prevalence among IGO formation and IGO enlargement observations.



Figure 2: *Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model over Time*: The figure displays the proportion of state-IGO-year observations estimated to be consistent with the geopolitical model by the finite mixture model for each year in the sample.

(See Figure 3 and Table A9 in the Appendix). For example, democratic states appear to be significantly less geopolitical in their approach to IGO membership. Approximately 30% of democratic country observations are consistent with the geopolitical model; the remaining 70% are driven by economic concerns. Among non-democracies, 51% of observations are driven by geopolitics and 49% by economics.

Finally, the mixture model can track changes in particular states' IGO membership behavior. Figures A5-A9 in the Appendix demonstrate how Russia, Iran, China, the United States, and Japan have shifted over time in the attention each state devotes to geopolitical considerations when making institutional membership choices. These countries were selected to exhibit the trend among three major powers and two representatives of unchanging alliance patterns (Japan) and alliance breaks (Iran). Notably, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the outward turn of China starting in the 1970s correspond with less



Figure 3: *Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model for Different Samples*: The figure displays the proportion of state-IGO-year observations consistent with the geopolitical model. Each barplot represents a different sample for the specified subset of observations. The left graph uses the average state alliance measure, and the right graph shows estimates from the lead state alliance measure.

weight given to geopolitics even as they remain higher than the United States. The US case may also be skewed by its joining most organizations and then exercising geopolitics from within, vis-a-vis the entry of other states. This outward geopolitics is not captured as part of the US membership decisions, but rather in the potential member states that are recruited or excluded.

4 Concluding remarks

This paper demonstrates that geopolitical alignment increases the probability that states will join the same multilateral economic institutions. This relationship holds both when institutions form and when they expand. We find that geopolitics more fully accounts for nearly half of state membership in economic IGOs, roughly equivalent to the explanatory power of economic interdependence. States weigh security and economic interests when making decisions about multilateral economic cooperation, and our evidence indicates that in many cases the former loom larger than the latter. Security externality and security linkage strategies motivate this pattern – while such logic is well known to shape bilateral trade and aid flows, we demonstrate that states act on these incentives to use multilateral economic organizations as tools of economic statecraft via geopolitical discrimination over membership.

Our argument introduces a different source of demand for institutions outside of promoting cooperation in an issue area. Geopolitical discrimination over membership opens the possibility for more impact by the institution on state behavior because entry is not simply derivative of preferences within the issue area. Subordinating membership choices to security interests, however, could undercut effectiveness. Just as political allocation undermines the efficacy of foreign aid (Dreher et al., 2013), the geopolitics of IGO membership may distort the credibility of institutional commitments. As security ties take precedence over policy reform, compliance levels may worsen and result in lower cooperation. This in turn creates pressures for institutional proliferation to address the shortcomings of existing IGOs.

The foreign policy role of IGOs should shape how scholars assess institutional effectiveness. Evaluating outcomes based on policy reforms within the issue area neglects the foreign policy benefits of membership. Identifying a causal relationship between institutions and peace becomes even more difficult, however, in light of the geopolitical bias in membership. To the extent that states join IGOs because they already have common security interests, a spurious relationship could generate the observed correlation between IGO membership and peace.

The question of why and how states cooperate is fundamentally connected to the question of *who* states choose as partners for cooperation. Joining an institution is not the same as signing a contract with an anonymous actor. In the small community of states, political relations provide a rich context as both sources of information and mutual interests. Against this backdrop, states form club-style IGOs that favor entry by friends and exclude rivals.

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Appendices

The Forces of Attraction:

How Security Interests Shape Membership in Economic Institutions

A Figures

Figure A1: Effect of Alternative Geopolitical Measures on IGO Membership Choices



Figure A1: *Effect of Alternative Geopolitical Measures on IGO Membership Choices*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting each independent variable from each sample mean to one standard deviation above the mean. We show separate estimates for the full sample as well as entry-only, IGO formation, and IGO enlargement observations. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 quasi-bayesian monte carlo simulations.

Figure A2: Effect of Alliances in Different Samples of Economic IGOs



Figure A2: *Effect of Alliances in Different Samples of Economic IGOs*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting the Average Alliances variable from each sample mean to one standard deviation above the mean. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 quasi-bayesian monte carlo simulations of the full model (Table 1, Model 2).

Figure A3: Effect of Alliances in Different Issue Areas



Figure A3: *Effect of Alliances in Different Issue Areas*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting the Average Alliances variable from each sample mean to one standard deviation above the mean. IGOs are coded as "broadly" part of an issue area if there is any mention of topics related to the issue in the IGO charter document or the description in the Yearbook of International Organizations, and "narrowly" part of an issue area if there is no mention of another issue. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 quasi-bayesian monte carlo simulations of the full model (Table 1, Model 2).

Figure A4: Assignment of Observations to Geopolitical Model



Figure A4: *Assignment of Observations to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the frequency with which observations in our sample of state membership in economic IGOs are sorted into the geopolitical model. In the finite mixture model, each state-IGO-year observation is assigned a weighted mixture of the economic and geopolitical models. A value of one on the x-axis indicates an observation is wholly generated by the geopolitical model. The figure reveals two clusters of observations: one group that is primarily consistent with the geopolitical model (around .55 on the x-axis) and one group that is more consistent with the economic model (around .3). Very few observations lie at the extreme ends with complete sorting by one model. Rather, a high proportion of observations are drawn from both geopolitical and economic models.

Figure A5: Russia: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model



Figure A5: *Russia: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of Russia's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). The collapse of the USSR in 1991 is reflected in the figure as a sharp reduction in the share of observations attributed to geopolitics.

Figure A6: Iran: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model



Figure A6: *Iran: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of Iran's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). In the figure, the period of alliance ties with the United States during the fifties and sixties appears in the form of more geopolitical decisions on membership, and the break of relations with the United States in 1979 following the Iranian Revolution corresponds to a lower level of geopolitical motivation as alliances are less important for Iranian membership patterns.

Figure A7: China: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model



Figure A7: *China: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of China's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). China's outward turn and attempt to restore diplomatic ties in the 1970s is reflected as a decrease in the share of observations attributed to the geopolitical model.

Figure A8: United States: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model



Figure A8: *United States: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of the United States's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). The United States has a low propensity to join IGOs based on geopolitics than other countries, according to the mixture model. The US case may also be skewed by its joining most organizations and then exercising geopolitics from within vis-a-vis the entry of other states. This outward geopolitics is not captured as part of the US membership decisions, but rather in the target states that are recruited or excluded.

Figure A9: Japan: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model



Figure A9: *Japan: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of the Japan's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). Japan is among the least geopolitical in its determination of membership decisions, which conforms to the post-war choices to privilege economic growth and rely on its steady alliance with the United States. Exclusion as a former enemy politicized some of its entry decisions in the 1950s, but the Japanese government sought to renew ties with a world that had been broken during the war; it applied to join any organization possible as part of this strategy to restore its position within international society. Then, the end of the Cold War increased uncertainty for Japan both in relation to the United States and the rising power of China. Japan began to pay more attention to geopolitics in its foreign aid policies in the 1990s, reflected as a slight uptick in proportion of IGO membership decisions that reflect a geopolitical logic.

B Tables

Table A1: Effect of Geopolitics on IGO Membership: Alternative Measures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
S-score	2.398***	3.851***		
	(0.254)	(0.458)		
UN Ideal Point Similarity			0.741***	0.809***
			(0.052)	(0.077)
Trade with Members	0.231***	0.386***	0.228***	0.357***
	(0.011)	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.031)
Polity	0.003	0.006	−0.004	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)
GDP	−0.103***	−0.079	−0.052***	0.072
	(0.019)	(0.050)	(0.018)	(0.048)
GDP per capita		−0.219***		−0.210***
		(0.041)		(0.041)
Trade Openness		−0.016**		−0.023**
		(0.007)		(0.012)
Stringent Accession		−0.054		0.026
		(0.051)		(0.051)
Regional IGO		0.601***		0.640***
		(0.101)		(0.110)
Cold War		0.181***		−0.063
		(0.043)		(0.045)
Observations	527,600	527,600	545,197	545,197
# IGOs	231	231	231	231
# States	164	164	164	164

Table A1: *Effect of Geopolitics on IGO Membership: Alternative Measures*. Coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include the following controls (not shown): *GDP*, *GDP per capita*, *Trade Openness*, *Stringent Accession*, *Regional IGO*, *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A2: Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership: Additional Models

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership							
	FDI	Lag DV	Excl NATO	CW	Defense Pacts	Alliance Count	Distance	Cox PH
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Average Alliances	1.744^{***}	1.237^{***}	2.237^{***}	2.012^{***}	1.872^{***}	2.380^{***}	1.855^{***}	2.133^{***}
	(0.198)	(0.164)	(0.153)	(0.171)	(0.174)	(0.187)	(0.171)	(0.243)
Trade with Members	0.517^{***}	0.105^{***}	0.277^{***}	0.295^{***}	0.298^{***}	0.282^{***}	0.281^{***}	0.091^{***}
	(0.048)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.021)
Incoming FDI	-0.030							
	(0.025)							
Outgoing FDI	-0.001							
	(0.008)							
Alliances * Cold War				-0.129				
				(0.149)				
Alliance Count						-0.014^{*}		
						(0.007)		
ln(Avg. Distance)							-0.250^{***}	
							(0.090)	
Polity	0.019^{**}	0.023^{***}	0.019^{***}	0.011^{*}	0.009	0.008	0.013^{**}	0.021^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Cold War	-0.0003	-0.446^{***}	-0.083^{**}	-0.009	-0.047	-0.023	-0.011	-0.184^{**}
	(0.044)	(0.105)	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.060)
Observations	272,501	560,105	480,210	570,695	570,695	570,695	570,695	117,879
# IGOs	217	231	231	231	231	231	231	231
# States	147	164	137	164	164	164	164	164

Table A2: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership: Additional Models*. Coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include the following controls (not shown): *GDP*, *GDP per capita*, *Trade Openness*, *Stringent Accession*, *Regional IGO*, *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A3: Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership (Excluding Alliance-related IGOs)

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership							
	(1) Baseline	(2) Full	(3) Entry	(4) Formation	(5) Expansion	(6) Exit	(7) State-IGO FE	(8) Diff-in-Diff
Average Alliances	1.321^{***}	1.910^{***}	1.281^{***}	1.368^{***}	1.339^{***}	-0.243	3.414^{***}	0.330^{***}
	(0.117)	(0.175)	(0.230)	(0.149)	(0.301)	(0.266)	(0.337)	(0.028)
Trade with Members	0.192^{***}	0.296^{***}	0.184^{***}	0.163^{***}	0.248^{***}	-0.011	0.149^{***}	0.012^{***}
	(0.010)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.050)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.001)
Polity	0.003	0.012^{**}	0.024^{**}	0.020^{***}	0.026^{**}	-0.014	0.017^{**}	0.003^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.001)
GDP	-0.093^{***}	0.052	-0.002	-0.052^{*}	-0.024	0.041	-0.658^{***}	0.022^{***}
	(0.018)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.085)	(0.060)	(0.203)	(0.006)
GDP per capita		-0.244^{***}	-0.088^{*}	-0.230^{***}	-0.086	-0.181^{***}	0.558^{***}	-0.015^{***}
		(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.036)	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.191)	(0.005)
Trade Openness		-0.018^{***}	-0.031^{***}	-0.036	-0.038^{***}	0.016	-0.027^{***}	-0.001^{***}
		(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.034)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.0002)
Stringent Accession		0.109^{**}	0.174	-0.454^{***}	0.296^{**}	-0.230^{*}		0.015^{***}
		(0.049)	(0.117)	(0.049)	(0.138)	(0.135)		(0.005)
Regional IGO		0.358^{***}	-0.198	0.119^{*}	-0.315^{*}	-0.804^{***}	-2.625^{***}	0.046^{***}
		(0.102)	(0.144)	(0.070)	(0.188)	(0.199)	(0.355)	(0.012)
Cold War		-0.038	-0.278^{***}	-0.227^{**}	-0.198^{***}	-1.073^{***}	-0.583^{***}	
		(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.103)	(0.069)	(0.281)	(0.072)	
Observations	558,840	558,840	361,987	10,289	351,705	208,445	361,987	558,840
# IGOs	222	222	222	185	222	219	222	222
# States	164	164	164	164	164	164	164	164

Table A3: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership*. Results of logit models estimating the effect of alliances on membership in economic IGOs. Coefficient estimates are displayed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models 2-6 include the following controls (not shown): *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *State-IGO Same Region*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A4: Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership (IGO Type)

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Average Alliances	2.073***	2.005***	1.863***	1.953***
	(0.182)	(0.176)	(0.175)	(0.168)
Average Alliances * Stringent Accession	−0.495**			
	(0.204)			
Trade with Members	0.298***	0.302***	0.286***	0.311***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Polity	0.011*	0.009	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
GDP	0.052	0.055	0.072	−0.003
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.064)
GDP per capita	−0.243***	−0.258***	−0.249***	−0.233***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Trade Openness	−0.014***	−0.013***	−0.012**	−0.016***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Stringent Accession	0.161***	0.073	0.030	0.057
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.058)
Regional IGO	0.317***	0.318***	0.310***	0.437***
	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.108)
Cold War	−0.041	−0.047	−0.011	−0.056
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.045)
Observations	570,695	550,809	493,597	435,551
# IGOs	231	215	204	200
# States	164	164	164	164

Table A4: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership*. Results of logit models estimating the effect of alliances on membership in economic IGOs. Model 1 includes the full sample and tests the interaction between stringent accession procedures and geopolitical alignment. Models 2-4 replicate the main specification in sub-samples while excluding particular IGO types from the sample: free trade agreements (2), banks (3), and commodity organizations (4). Controls include (not shown): *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *Regional IGO*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A5: Effect of Geopolitical Alignment by Decade

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership
Average Alliances	1.724^{***}
	(0.279)
Trade with Members	0.185^{***}
	(0.039)
Average Alliances * 1950-1959	-0.234
	(0.238)
Average Alliances * 1960-1969	0.166
	(0.297)
Average Alliances * 1970-1979	0.422
	(0.314)
Average Alliances * 1980-1989	0.290
	(0.302)
Average Alliances * 1990-1999	0.127
	(0.289)
Average Alliances * 2000-2009	0.282
	(0.293)
Average Alliances * 2010-2014	0.258
	(0.291)
Observations	570,695
# IGOs	231
# States	164

Table A5: *Effect of Geopolitical Alignment by Decade*. Results of a logit model estimating the effect of alliances on membership in economic IGOs. We use the full sample from Table 1, Model 2 with the addition of decade-period interactions for the alliance and trade variables (interaction terms for trade*decade are omitted due to space constraints). Controls include (not shown): *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *Regional IGO*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A6: Interactive Effect of Alliances, Trade

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership
Average Alliances	4.706^{***}
	(0.647)
Trade with Members	0.340^{***}
	(0.040)
Average Alliances *	-0.153^{***}
Trade with Members	(0.037)
Polity	0.012^{*}
	(0.006)
GDP	0.049
	(0.059)
GDP per capita	-0.252^{***}
	(0.042)
Trade Openness	-0.016^{***}
	(0.005)
Stringent	0.073
Accession	(0.049)
Regional IGO	0.331^{***}
	(0.102)
Cold War	-0.050
	(0.040)
Observations	570,695
# IGOs	231
# States	164

Table A6: *Interactive Effect of Alliances, Trade*. Results of a logit model estimating the effect of alliances on membership in economic IGOs. We use the full sample from Table 1, Model 2 with the addition of an interaction between *Average Alliances* and *Trade with Members*. Controls include (not shown): *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *Regional IGO*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A7: IGO Membership: Full Sample of State-IGO-Years

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership							
	(1) Baseline	(2) Full	(3) Entry	(4) Formation	(5) Expansion	(6) Exit	(7) State-IGO FE	(8) Diff-in-Diff
Avg. Alliances	2.020***	2.547***	1.826***	2.564***	1.712***	0.062	4.699***	0.352***
	(0.125)	(0.201)	(0.286)	(0.149)	(0.353)	(0.238)	(0.343)	(0.023)
Trade with Members	0.268***	0.312***	0.231***	0.215***	0.290***	−0.036	0.211***	0.005***
	(0.014)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.053)	(0.027)	(0.055)	(0.001)
Polity	−0.003	0.004	0.007	0.012**	0.005	−0.004	0.019**	0.001**
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.0004)
GDP	−0.171***	0.060	−0.009	−0.133***	−0.020	0.047	−0.203	0.016***
	(0.017)	(0.065)	(0.080)	(0.039)	(0.094)	(0.050)	(0.171)	(0.003)
GDP per capita		−0.222***	−0.024	−0.202***	−0.023	−0.184***	0.056	−0.005*
		(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.155)	(0.003)
Trade Openness		−0.018***	−0.042***	−0.060	−0.049***	0.014	−0.028***	−0.0002
		(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.060)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.0002)
Stringent Accession		−0.016	−0.457***	−0.486***	−0.499***	−0.102		0.001
		(0.040)	(0.085)	(0.048)	(0.102)	(0.115)		(0.003)
Regional IGO		−0.502***	−1.334***	−1.180***	−1.425***	−1.077***	−3.063***	−0.032***
		(0.075)	(0.111)	(0.055)	(0.139)	(0.183)	(0.377)	(0.007)
Cold War		−0.081**	−0.240***	−0.455***	−0.185***	−1.154***	−0.578***	
		(0.039)	(0.061)	(0.085)	(0.071)	(0.253)	(0.065)	
Observations	1,245,049	1,245,049	971,419	23,290	948,137	295,885	971,419	1,245,049
# IGOs	253	253	253	204	253	250	253	253
# States	164	164	164	164	164	164	164	164

Table 4: Table A7: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership, Full Sample*. Re-estimation of Table 1 with the full sample of state-IGO-years for all economic IGOs. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A8: IGO Membership: Geopolitical vs. Economic Lead State Models

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership		
	Geopolitical Model	Economic Model	Pooled Model
Alliance Lead State	1.765^{***}		1.036^{***}
	(0.100)		(0.104)
Trade with Lead State		0.348^{***}	0.083^{***}
		(0.014)	(0.011)
Polity	-0.026^{***}	0.009	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
GDP	0.132^{**}	0.251^{***}	0.170^{***}
	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.060)
GDP per capita	-0.069^{*}	-0.542^{***}	-0.158^{***}
	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.047)
Trade Openness	-0.010^{***}	0.001	-0.006
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Stringent Accession	0.177^{***}	-0.251^{***}	0.075
	(0.053)	(0.067)	(0.053)
Regional IGO	1.157^{***}	-0.452^{***}	0.573^{***}
	(0.112)	(0.121)	(0.105)
Existing Members from Region	0.106^{***}	0.497^{***}	0.158^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Fatal MIDs with Members	0.501^{***}	-0.119	0.330^{**}
	(0.169)	(0.144)	(0.149)
Cold War	-0.430^{***}	0.075	-0.016
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.042)
Observations	301,732	237,250	538,983

Table A8: *IGO Membership: Geopolitical vs. Economic Lead State Models*. Models 1-2 display results of a mixture model which assumes IGO Membership is driven either by a geopolitical (Model 1) or an economic process (Model 2) with respect to the lead state of an IGO. Model 3 is a pooled specification in which all observations are assumed to arise from the same data-generating process. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A9: Percent of Observations Consistent with Geopolitical Model

	1	0
Cold War	0.424	0.459
Stringent Accession	0.442	0.439
Regional IGO	0.445	0.429
Democratic State	0.513	0.313

Table A9: *Percent of Observations Consistent with Geopolitical Model*: The table shows the percent of observations assigned to the geopolitical model for a range of independent variables. Estimated assignment is from the finite mixture model described in Table 2.

Table A10: Mixture Model: Formation vs. Enlargement

	Geopolitical Model	Economic Model
Entry-Only Sample	43.8%	56.2%
IGO Formation	51.8%	48.2%
IGO Enlargement	43.6%	56.4%

Table A10: *Mixture Model: Formation vs. Enlargement* : The table shows the percent of observations assigned to the geopolitical and economic models for the estimates from the finite mixture model analysis for the entry-only sample of IGO membership (This is parallel to the logistic regression specification in Table 1 Model 3, and the full covariates for mixture model with entry-only membership are shown in table A11). The first row represents the entire sample of IGO entry observations, the second row shows assignment for sub-sample of IGO formation observations, and the third row IGO enlargement observations.

C IGO Entry Results

Figure A10: Substantive Effect of Geopolitial Alignment on IGO Entry



Figure A10: *Substantive Effect of Geopolitical Alignment on IGO Entry*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting a variable of interest. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 quasi-bayesian monte carlo simulations of the full model (Model 2).

Table A11: IGO Entry: Geopolitical vs. Economic Models

	Dependent variable: IGO Entry		
	Geopolitical Model	Economic Model	Pooled Model
Average Alliances	1.763^{***}		1.279^{***}
	(0.164)		(0.231)
Trade with Members		1.045^{***}	0.185^{***}
		(0.079)	(0.030)
Polity	0.094^{***}	-0.038^{**}	0.022^{**}
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.009)
GDP	0.164^{***}	-0.481^{***}	-0.001
	(0.038)	(0.117)	(0.065)
GDP per capita	-0.245^{***}	-0.014	-0.091^{*}
	(0.044)	(0.067)	(0.049)
Trade Openness	-0.015^{**}	-0.222^{***}	-0.032^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.062)	(0.011)
Stringent Accession	-0.222^{***}	1.343^{***}	0.128
	(0.070)	(0.159)	(0.113)
Regional IGO	0.463^{***}	-3.091^{***}	-0.218
	(0.110)	(0.313)	(0.146)
Existing Members from Region	0.060^{***}	0.150^{***}	0.092^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Fatal MIDs with Members	0.105	0.457^{**}	0.289^{*}
	(0.144)	(0.197)	(0.160)
Cold War	0.492^{***}	-1.682^{***}	-0.271^{***}
	(0.067)	(0.090)	(0.054)
Observations	162,790	208,560	371,350

Table A11: *IGO Entry: Geopolitical vs. Economic Models*. Models 1-2 display results of a finite mixture model which assumes IGO Entry is driven either by a geopolitical process (Model 1) or an economic process (Model 2). Model 3 is a pooled specification. All are estimated by a logistic regression with cubic polynomial terms to correct for time dependence (not shown). Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Figure A11: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model over Time, IGO Entry



Figure A11: *Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model over Time, IGO Entry*: The figure displays the proportion of state-IGO-year observations estimated to be consistent with the geopolitical model by the finite mixture model for each year in the sample.

Figure A12: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model for Different Samples, IGO Entry



Figure A12: *Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model for Different Samples, IGO Entry*: The figure displays the proportion of state-IGO-year observations consistent with the geopolitical model. Each barplot represents a different sample for the specified subset of observations. The left graph uses the average state alliance measure, and the right graph shows estimates from the lead state alliance measure.